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Abstract
We use the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) to study 
the extent to which the acquisition of multiple houses is determined by the presence of 
male children in the family. We conjecture that, as a result of the very high sex ratio which 
can be observed in China following the one child policy, Chinese families who have a son 
may want to acquire additional dwellings to enhance the marriage chances of their son. 
In support of this argument, we find that families with male children aged 25 or older are 
most likely to acquire additional houses. This effect is highest in regions characterised by 
higher sex ratios, especially in rural areas.
Keywords China · Children’s gender · Acquisition of multiple dwellings · Sex ratios
1 Introduction
The Chinese housing market has witnessed a boom over the last two decades. Following 
the privatization of the housing sector in 1998, home ownership in China has risen sub-
stantially, standing at roughly 90% compared to about 65% in the US (Glaeser et al., 2017). 
The increased demand for houses has driven prices up, especially in areas such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen. Several households own more than one home and often these 
houses are unoccupied. One questions therefore what has driven this housing boom, and 
in particular, the decision of households to acquire multiple homes. The literature on this 
topic is scant and mainly concentrates on investment (Li and Wu, 2014) and/or speculation 
as motives for multiple-home ownership (Cao et al., 2018).
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In this paper, we propose an alternative explanation, centered on the role of male chil-
dren present in the family. This line of research is motivated by literature, which has sug-
gested that due to the unbalanced sex ratio in China,1 those parents who have a male child 
save more in order to improve their son’s marriage prospects (Wei and Zhang, 2011). Con-
sidering that a house is viewed as a status good in China (Wei et al., 2017),2 we extend this 
literature by investigating the extent to which the acquisition of multiple dwellings may 
also be a way for families to improve the marriage prospects of their son. Specifically, we 
investigate the extent to which families with at least one son close to marriage age are more 
likely to acquire additional houses. Next, we investigate whether the association between 
having a son and multiple-home acquisition is stronger in those provinces characterized 
by a more unbalanced sex ratio. This would support our hypothesis that the acquisition of 
multiple dwellings is driven by a desire to improve sons’ marriage prospects.
In order to investigate these issues, we use the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China House-
hold Finance Survey (CHFS) to estimate a model aimed at understanding the determinants 
of multiple-home acquisition, controlling for demographic, education, and job-related 
characteristics of the household head, as well as risk attitudes and family income. We find 
that around 10% of households acquired an additional house between the two waves of the 
CHFS. Furthermore, we find that Chinese families with at least one son aged 25 or above 
have a significantly higher probability of acquiring an additional home. This effect is high-
est in regions characterized by a high sex ratio, especially in rural areas.
The remaining part of this paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 contains a brief litera-
ture review. Section 3 describes our hypotheses. Section 4 illustrates our baseline speci-
fications. Section 5 describes our data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 6 
presents our empirical results and Sect. 7 concludes.
2  Literature review
In this section, we first survey the literature on multiple-home ownership in countries 
other than China. We then provide a brief overview of the housing reforms in China, and 
describe the literature on multiple-home ownership in China, as well as research relating to 
son preferences, sex ratios, and home ownership. Finally, we outline our contribution to the 
literature.
2.1  Multiple‑home ownership in countries other than China
Multiple-home ownership has become increasingly widespread worldwide. A large empiri-
cal literature has emphasized that the proportion of the population owning multiple houses 
is booming in some countries. For instance, more than 36% and 22% of households own 
additional houses for recreational and business purposes, respectively in Spain and Italy 
(Sierminska and Doorley, 2013). Similarly, around 20% of Swedish households and 50% of 
1 The sex ratio is defined as the ratio of males to females born in a given province. As a result of the one 
child policy, and considering Chinese people’s preference for sons (Chen et al., 2013), and the wide avail-
ability of ultrasound B machines, the sex ratio has become increasingly unbalanced in China (Wei et al., 
2017).
2 Wei et al. (2017) argue that: “Housing wealth is a status good because it is one of the sorting variables 
that affect how a young man (or woman) is ranked relative to his/her competitors”. (p. 170).
To what extent is the Chinese housing boom driven by competition…
1 3
all Northern European households have access to second houses (Dijst et al., 2005; Müller, 
2007). However, there are only few studies on the determinants of multiple-home owner-
ship (Paris, 2009).
Relying on the European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC) 
over the period 2003–2006, Norris and Winston (2010) examine the correlation between 
demographic factors and multiple-home ownership in Ireland. Their first finding is that 
household wealth affects second-home ownership. Secondly, the authors find that second-
home ownership peaks just before retirement, as it is seen as a sort of retirement plan. Hall 
et al. (2004) and Brown et al. (2008) also find a significant association between retirement 
and the acquisition of multiple homes.
Based on the 2011 Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS), 
which covers household balance sheets of 15 European countries, Arrondel et al. (2014) 
examine which household characteristics can explain multiple-home ownership. Firstly, 
they argue that household income is positively associated with both the probability and 
the value of owning second/third homes. Di et al. (2001) reach a similar conclusion for the 
US. Secondly, Arrondel et al. (2014) find that the probability of owning multiple homes 
is positively correlated to inheritance in Europe. Based on data drawn from 12,652 pre-
retirement age households in the US, Cox and Stark (2005) also uncover a significant asso-
ciation between inheritance and multiple-home ownership.
2.2  Housing reforms in China
As a result of the transition from a planned economy to a market economy, market mecha-
nisms were introduced into socialist China. In order to stimulate housing consumption, the 
government created a housing market in the traditional housing system and allowed the 
housing stock to be privatized. Welfare housing was gradually transformed into commodity 
housing. These changes affected households’ housing acquisition behaviour, as well as the 
entire socialist housing system in China. As a result, private housing ownership increased 
drastically: Chamon and Prasad (2010) document that whilst in 1990, only 17% of Chinese 
households owned their homes, the corresponding figure in 2005 was 86%. Furthermore, 
the increased demand for houses has driven prices up, especially in areas such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen (Glaeser et al., 2017). Several Chinese households now own more 
than one house and often these houses are unoccupied.
2.3  Multiple‑home ownership in China
Although multiple-home ownership has received attention in the US and European coun-
tries (Arrondel et al., 2014; Di et al., 2001; Dijst et al., 2005; Cox and Stark, 2005; Müller, 
2007; Norris and Winston, 2010; Sierminska and Doorley, 2013), little is known about the 
situation in China.
Using a survey conducted in 2005, which includes 93 interviewees from Haikou (the 
capital city of the Hainan province), Wang (2006) analyzes the second-home boom in the 
city. He argues that because of its superb environmental conditions, Haikou is one of the 
most popular cities in China where people, and especially those who suffer from M2.5 air 
pollution in the mainland, acquire second homes. This finding is similar to that in Gallent 
and Tewdwr-Jones (2018), who also finds that water-side areas in Western countries are 
attractive to second residential dwelling buyers. Another reason for non-local households 
to acquire second homes in Haikou is down to the so called ‘examination immigration’: 
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The admission criterion of the ‘China college entrance examination’ for Hainan students 
is in fact lower than in mainland areas. This encourages parents to gain Hainan hukou for 
their college-age children through local housing acquisitions, so that the children can ben-
efit from the local admission criteria.
Hui and Yu (2009) make use of a survey conducted by the Census and Statistics Depart-
ment (CSD), which covers 13,397 Hong Kong households over the period May–July 2005. 
The authors explore reasons why Hong Kong residents purchase second homes in mainland 
China. Specifically, mainland second-home acquisitions are likely to occur among middle-
aged Hong Kong households. Due to the improved transportation between Hong Kong and 
the mainland, about 200,000 Hong Kong residents work on mainland China. This makes 
owning second homes on the mainland convenient. The authors argue that young people 
are more likely to acquire their first or primary residence in the mainland, while the mid-
dle-aged residents prefer second-home ownership. This can be explained bearing in mind 
that middle-aged households are more constrained by their family responsibilities in Hong 
Kong.
Feng and Zhou (2004) analyse data drawn from 1,000 questionnaires filled in by Beijing 
households in 8 representative districts. They report that, due to the very high commuting 
times in Beijing, 23.7% of Beijing households own second homes that are close to their 
workplaces. Lee and Xiao (1998) study the distinct relationship between inheritance and 
home ownership in China using data from the China Survey on Support Systems for the 
Elderly in 1992. They find that short-term exchanges between generations involving hous-
ing and financial transfers are peculiar to China, while these are not common in other coun-
tries. Specifically, elderly Chinese parents are likely to provide financial support for their 
adult children’s home acquisitions.
Based on the 2005 CGSS (China General Social Survey) that covers 26 provinces in 
China, Huang and Yi (2011) examine the housing acquisition behaviour of Chinese house-
holds. They find that public housing has a positive influence on second-home acquisition 
in China. This is because households having access to public housing only enjoy partial 
property rights, but are not de facto homeowners. This encourages them to buy second-
ary real estate of their own. Furthermore, even if the property rights of public housing are 
possessed by public institutions and work units, households can still benefit from low hous-
ing prices. Therefore, public housing reduces the burden on households, enabling them to 
afford further real estate. This phenomenon is unique to China.
Based on the 2011 wave of the CHFS, Cao et al. (2018) find that households are more 
likely to own multiple houses when expecting higher capital gains. They also argue that 
wealthier households are more sensitive to changes in expected capital gains.
2.4  Son preference, sex ratios and home ownership in China
The paper closest to ours are Li and Wu (2017) and Wei et al. (2017). The former makes 
use of the 2010 wave of the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) to study the extent to 
which having a son is associated with family wealth. They find that having a son has a 
significant positive effect on various components of family wealth. Specifically, households 
with a son have a higher probability of owning a house, own more and larger houses, and 
acquire their houses earlier. Wei et  al. (2017) use data from the 2005 1% survey of the 
Chinese population to show that in regions characterised by higher sex ratios, households, 
and especially those with unmarried sons at home, tend to buy larger houses and to pay a 
higher price per square meter.
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2.5  Our contribution
We advance the literature by analysing, for the first time, the extent to which having a son 
affects decisions to acquire additional houses. This research question is motivated by the 
existence of high sex ratios in China, which make it difficult for many men to find a wife 
(Wei and Zhang, 2011; Wei et al., 2017). As a house is regarded as a status good, house-
holds with one or more sons may decide to acquire additional houses for their son(s) in 
order to enhance their marriage prospects. We build on Li and Wu (2017) by focusing on 
the determinants of the actual acquisition of additional houses rather than just the owner-
ship of multiple houses, which may have been acquired a long time ago, before the start 
of the survey.3 We then investigate, for the first time, whether the association between 
sons and the acquisition of multiple dwellings varies according to the age of the son, and 
whether this phenomenon is more widespread in provinces with higher sex ratios. This 
part of our work builds on Wei et al. (2017), who show that average home value and size in 
China vary systematically with local sex ratios.
3  Hypotheses
3.1  General hypothesis on multiple‑home acquisition in China
There is a long history of preference for having baby boys in China (Chen et al., 2013). 
Although, this preference is no longer popular among young generations and not encour-
aged by the government, it is still deeply rooted within Chinese traditional cultural values. 
In this context, having sons is believed to have an impact on households’ financial behav-
iour in China.
Because of the son-preference culture, parents in China typically tend to provide more 
support to their sons than their daughters, especially on the financial side. Knight et  al. 
(2010) find that Chinese households are motivated to earn more if their child is male. They 
intend to earn more for their sons because they believe that sons deserve more than daugh-
ters. In addition, Chinese families with boys are found to spend more on health relative to 
families with girls (Song, 2000). The same applies to the share of expenditure on educa-
tion, given that parents in China have higher expectations from boys in terms of educa-
tional achievements (Burgess and Zhuang, 2000). We hypothesise that housing expendi-
tures follow a similar pattern. We therefore hypothesise that:
H1: Families with (a) son(s) are more likely to acquire multiple residential dwellings, 
compared to families with no son(s).
3.2  Multiple‑home acquisition and children’s marriage status in China
As a result of the one child policy, the son-preference culture, and the increased availabil-
ity of ultrasound B machines after the mid-80s, aggressive sex selective abortions took 
place in China from the mid-1980s onwards (Wei et al., 2017). This has led to a very high 
sex ratio in the country. Wei and Zhang (2011) argue that families with sons save more in 
China to enhance their sons’ marriage prospects, in a society characterised by an unbal-
anced sex ratio. A higher wealth level is in fact considered as a great advantage in the 
3 This is made possible by the fact that we have two years of data available.
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marriage market. As a home is seen as a status good in China (Wei et al., 2017), we believe 
that families with a son close to marriage age are more likely to acquire second homes.4 As 
a result, we hypothesise that:
H2: Families with (a) son(s) close to marriage age are more likely to acquire multiple 
residential dwellings, compared to families with no/younger son(s).
3.3  Multiple‑home acquisition and sex ratios
If the acquisition of additional houses is motivated by the desire to enhance the marriage 
prospects of sons, as discussed in Sect. 3.2, then we expect the association between male 
children close to marriage age and multiple-home acquisition to be stronger in provinces 
characterised by higher sex ratios. In other words:
H3: Families with (a) son(s) close to marriage age located in provinces characterised 
by relatively higher sex ratios are more likely to acquire multiple residential dwellings, 
compared to families located in other provinces.
4  Baseline models and estimation methodology
4.1  Baseline models
4.1.1  Testing the effect of children’s gender on multiple‑home acquisition
To test the effects of having son(s) on the probability of acquiring additional homes, we 
estimate the following equation using a Probit model. This follows the approaches of 
Arrondel et al. (2014) and Huang and Yi (2011):
The subscript i represents households, and the subscript t represents time.  Acquiremultii,t 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has acquired an additional home between 
the 2011 and the 2013 waves of the CHFS, and 0 otherwise.5
When focusing on the determinants of Acquiremultii,t , the independent variables include 
Soni,t  (a dummy variable equal to 1 if household i has at least one son at time t, and 0 oth-
erwise), which aims at testing the effect of having a son on multiple-home acquisition, as 
well as some control variables, Xi,t , which represent a series of socio-demographic factors 
for household i. We also include the dummy Daughteri,t , which is equal to 1 if the house-
hold has at least one daughter, and 0 otherwise. Vp  represents a series of provincial dum-
mies, which encompass province-specific house prices, aimed at taking into account the 
investment opportunity motive for acquiring additional houses. The error term is indicated 
by i,t.
In line with Wei and Zhang (2011), who show that parents in China are willing to 
increase their saving ratios in order to enhance their sons’ marriage prospects, and with 
(1)Pr[Acquiremultii,t = 1] = Φ[ + 1Soni,t + 2Daughteri,t + 3Xi,t + Vp + i,t]
5 A household is assumed to have acquired an additional property between the 2011 and 2013 waves of 
the survey if it owned at least one house in both years and if the difference between the number of houses it 
owned in the two years is greater than or equal to 1.
4 It should also be noted that, in China, it is the grooms’ families who are expected to provide a residence 
to young couples (Brown et al., 2011).
To what extent is the Chinese housing boom driven by competition…
1 3
our first hypothesis, we expect to observe a positive and significant marginal effect associ-
ated with the Soni,tvariable.6 We remain sceptical about the marginal effect associated with 
Daughteri,t . A positive sign could be explained by the fact that households with a daughter 
may want to acquire more houses to increase the bargaining power of the daughters in their 
marriages (Wei and Zhang, 2011). On the other hand, households with a daughter may not 
need to acquire an additional residential dwelling for the daughter, as daughters in China 
typically move to their husbands’ family houses once married.
Our models control for age, education, household  size, migrant status, party 
 membership, income, wealth and types of occupation of the head of the household.7 Con-
sistent with widespread evidence, we would expect a household with an older, richer and 
better educated head, having higher political status and local hukou to show a higher prob-
ability of acquiring multiple houses (e.g. Hall et al., 2004; Wang, 2006; Norris and Win-
ston, 2010).
We also take the influence of households’ risk attitude into consideration. This is indi-
cated by the dummy variable  Riskaversioni,t  which takes the value of 1 if household i pre-
fers low-risk investments, and 0 otherwise. We expect to observe a positive marginal effect 
on risk aversion, as housing is a relatively safe asset.
Furthermore, we consider the effect of regional disparities on multiple-home acquisi-
tion. To this end, we include provincial dummies in all our models, and also control for a 
dummy variable, Policyareai,t , which is equal to 1 if the household is located in the three 
first-tier cities in China (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou), and 0 otherwise. We do not 
have clear expectations about the sign of this variable. On the one hand, the housing mar-
ket is booming in those areas, which could lead to a higher incentive for acquiring an addi-
tional house. On the other hand, house prices in these areas are very high, which may act as 
a deterrent to the acquisition of additional dwellings.
4.1.2  Differentiating the effect of children’s age on multiple‑ home acquisition
We then investigate the extent to which households’ multiple-home acquisition decisions 
depend on children’s age. Following Wei and Zhang (2011), we argue that households with 
sons are likely to improve their sons’ marriage competitiveness by providing additional 
houses for them. As a result, we expect parents with sons closer to the marriage age to 
be more likely to acquire additional houses. To test whether this is the case, we estimate 
Eq. (2), which differentiates children by gender and age:
The subscript i represents households, and t represents time. Son12i,t is a dummy equal 
to 1 if the household has a son aged at least 12, and 0 otherwise. Son13_24i,t is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the household has a son aged 13 to 24, and 0 otherwise. Son25i,t is a dummy 
equal to 1 if the household has a son aged at least 25, and 0 otherwise. Similar age-related 
dummies are included for daughters. Other control variables are the same as in Eq. (1).
(2)
Pr[Acquiremultii,t = 1] = Φ[ + 1Son12i,t + 2Son13_24i,t + 3Son25i,t
+ 4Daughter12i,t + 5Daughter13_24i,t + 6Daughter25i,t + 7Xi,t + Vp + i,t]
6 As discussed in Sect. 4.2, all our models are estimated using a Probit estimator. As such, we focus on 
marginal effects rather than coefficients.
7 Income and wealth are included to indirectly proxy for the investment opportunity motive for acquiring 
additional homes. Table A1 in the Appendix presents all variables used in our models and their definitions.
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In line with Hypothesis 2, we expect to observe positive and significant marginal effects 
associated with Son13_24i,t and Son25i,t , with the marginal effect associated with the latter 
dummy being the highest, as sons aged at least 25 are the closest to marriage age.
4.1.3  Testing the effect of living in high sex‑ratio provinces on multiple‑home 
acquisition
In order to test whether the effect of having a son close to marriage age on the likelihood 
to acquire multiple homes is higher for households based in provinces with high sex ratios, 
we estimate the following two Equations:
where Highi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if household i lives in a province with high 
sex ratio at time t, and 0 otherwise. In line with Hypothesis 3, we expect to observe the fol-
lowing relationship in Eq. (3): 𝛽21 > 𝛽22 > 0 . Similarly, in Eq. (4), we expect to observe: 
𝛽31 > 𝛽32 > 0 and 𝛽41 > 𝛽42 > 0.
4.2  Estimation methodology
Because our dependent variable is binary, all our models are estimated using a Probit esti-
mator, and marginal effects are reported and discussed in all Tables. Considering that our 
dependent variable represents the acquisition of additional dwellings and is calculated as 
a dummy equal to 1 if the difference between the number of houses owned by the house-
hold in the 2013 and 2011 waves of the CHFS is greater than or equal to 1, only 2013 data 
are effectively used in estimation. All our regressions are therefore cross-sectional, and the 
subscript t in all equations corresponds to 2013.
5  Data and summary statistics
5.1  Data
We use the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), a 
biannual survey collected at the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in 
(3)
Pr[Acquiremultii,t = 1] = Φ[ + 1Highi,t + 21Highi,tSoni,t
+ 22(1 − Highi,t)Soni,t + 31Highi,tDaughteri,t
+ 32(1 − Highi,t)Daughteri,t + 4Xi,t + Vp + i,t]
(4)
Pr[Acquiremultii,t = 1] = Φ [ + 1Highi,t + 21Highi,tSon12i,t
22(1 − Highi,t)Son12i,t + 31Highi,tSon13_24i,t
+ 32(1 − Highi,t)Son13_24i,t + 41Highi,tSon25i,t + 42(1 − Highi,t)Son25i,t
+ 51Highi,tDaughter12i,t + 52(1 − Highi,t)Daughter12i,t
+ 61Highi,tDaughter13_24i,t + 62(1 − Highi,t)Daughter13_24i,t
+ 71Highi,tDaughter25i,t + 72(1 − Highi,t)Daughter25i,t + 8Xi,t + Vp + i,t]
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Chengdu (China).8 The survey is based on a three-stage stratified random sampling design. 
Specifically, at first, counties are randomly selected among 29 Chinese provinces. Sec-
ond, communities are randomly selected within each county. Finally, both urban and rural 
households are randomly selected within each community. The final sample, which is rep-
resentative of the Chinese population, and contains accurate and detailed information on 
households’ demographic characteristics, their financial and non-financial assets, and their 
business activities, contained 8,438 households in 2011 (Gan et  al., 2014). In 2013, the 
survey was expanded to 28,413 households to enhance representativeness at the provincial 
level.
Bearing in mind that our Acquiremulti variable is calculated as the difference in the 
number of dwellings owned in the two waves, only the 2013 wave is used in estimation. 
Moreover, because our focus is on multiple-home ownership, we only consider households 
which were already home owners in 2011. We also drop those observations with missing 
values for any of the regression variables in our models. Finally, in order to control for 
extreme values, we set the values of wealth and income in the top and bottom 1% of the 
distribution to missing. After the above adjustments, our final dataset includes 5,815 obser-
vations over the year 2013.
5.2  Summary statistics
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for our regression variables. We observe that 10.2% 
of our observations acquired an additional house between 2011 and 2013. Furthermore, 
53.9% of the observations in our sample have at least one son, whist 31.9% have at least 
one daughter. Focusing on socio-economic characteristics of the heads of the households 
included in our sample, we can see that the average age is 52.7 and that 7.4% of the house-
hold heads have a college education. About 5% of the household head are migrants, 31.8% 
are employed, 25.8% work in agriculture, and 16.0% are retired. 66.4% of our households 
live in urban areas.
Table  2 presents means of all our regression variables for households who acquired 
an additional house between the two waves and households who did not. We can see that 
62.0% (37.5%) of acquirers have a son (daughter), while the corresponding figure for non-
acquirers is 53.0% (31.2%). Both differences are statistically significant, and suggest that 
people who acquire second homes are more likely to have children, particularly sons. This 
provides some preliminary support for our Hypothesis 1.
Looking at the age of children, acquirers are more likely to have sons aged between 13 
and 24 and sons aged 25 or above, which is in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 2. 
Acquirers are also more likely to have daughters aged below 13. The differences among 
other age categories are not statistically significant. In terms of other variables, acquirers 
are typically younger, richer, and more likely to have a college degree, and a larger house-
hold. They are also more likely to be party members, employed, or self-employed. Finally, 
acquirers seem to be less likely to be risk-averse than non-acquirers.
8 We do not use the 2015 wave of the CHFS as information on the migrant status of the household, which 
is an important determinant of house purchase, is missing in that wave.
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6  Empirical results
6.1  Multiple‑home acquisition differentiating children by gender and age
Column 1 of Table 3 reports Probit estimates of Eq. (1). We can see that neither the mar-
ginal effect associated with the presence of sons, nor that associated with daughters are sta-
tistically significant. These findings do not support our Hypothesis 1 and seem to suggest 
that, controlling for other factors, multiple-home acquisitions in China are not associated 
with the presence of children. In line with the literature (e.g. Norris and Winston, 2010; 
Arrondel et  al., 2014), both income and wealth are positively associated with the acqui-
sition of additional houses. Furthermore, families whose head is self-employed and/or a 
party member are both more likely to acquire additional houses, as are larger households.
Column 2 presents Probit estimates of Eq. (2), whereby both sons and daughters are dif-
ferentiated in the following age groups: below 13, between 13 and 24, and 25 and above. 
We can see that having a male child aged 25 or above is associated with a 3.6 percentage 
point higher chance to acquire an additional house, whilst having a son aged 13 to 24 is 
Table 1  Sample means 
and standard deviations (in 
parentheses)
Note: Precise definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in 
the Appendix
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associated with a 2.1 percentage point higher chance. The latter effect is, however, only 
marginally significant. These findings, which support our second hypothesis, suggest that 
the acquisition of multiple houses may indeed be a way to enhance the marriage chances of 
sons in a world characterised by unbalanced sex ratios.
We also observe that having a son aged less than 13 is associated with a 2.8 percentage 
point lower chance of acquiring an additional house: This may be explained considering 
that parents of very young sons may prefer to save the money for the education of the child. 
By contrast, having a daughter aged below 13 is associated with a 2.5 percentage point 
higher chance of acquiring an additional house. This association, which can be explained 
considering that families with a young daughter may acquire an additional house to 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
differentiating households on 
the basis of whether or not they 
acquired an additional house 
between 2011 and 2013
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level; ** denotes sta-
tistical significance at 5% level;* denotes statistical significance at 








Son 0.530 0.620 −0.091***
Daughter 0.312 0.375 −0.062***
Son12 0.125 0.118 0.008
Son13_24 0.206 0.249 −0.043**
Son25 0.226 0.303 −0.076***
Daughter12 0.090 0.133 −0.043***
Daughter13_24 0.163 0.178 −0.016
Daughter25 0.079 0.094 −0.015
Age 52.956 50.644 2.312***
College 0.073 0.087 −0.015
Household size 3.508 4.035 −0.528***
Migrant 0.048 0.052 −0.004
Party membership 0.190 0.237 −0.047***
Income 0.525 0.788 −0.264***
Wealth 1.373 2.315 −0.942***
Employee 0.312 0.371 −0.060***
Selfemployed 0.085 0.141 −0.057***
Agriculture 0.261 0.235 0.025
Other job types 0.039 0.029 0.011
Retired 0.163 0.131 0.032**
Riskaversion 0.723 0.645 0.078***
Policyareas 0.081 0.097 −0.016
Urban 0.663 0.676 −0.013
High 0.568 0.597 −0.028
Observations 5220 595 −
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enhance their daughter’s bargaining power once she gets married (Wei and Zhang, 2011), 
is, however, only marginally significant.9
Focusing on other control variables, as in column 1, we observe that richer families, 
with self-employed heads who are also party members are more likely to acquire additional 
Table 3  Determinants of the probability of acquiring multiple homes differentiating households on the 
basis of the child’s gender and age (marginal effects)
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at 5% level;* 
denotes statistical significance at 10% level. Son13_24/21 is a dummy equal to 1 if the family has a son 
aged 13 to 24 (column 2) or 13 to 21 (column 3). Daughter13_24/19 is a dummy equal to 1 if the family has 
a daughter aged 13 to 24 (column 2) or 13 to 19 (column 3). Son25/22 is a dummy equal to 1 if the family 
has a son aged 25 or more (column 2) or 22 or more (column 3). Daughter25/20 is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the family has a daughter aged 25 or more (column 2) or 20 or more (column 3). Definitions of all other 
variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. All models were estimated using a Probit estimator. 
Provincial dummies are included in all specifications, but not reported for brevity
(1) (2) (3)
Kids; dy/dx (z-value) Age; dy/dx (z-value) Legal Age; dy/dx (z-value)
Son 0.005(0.54) – –
Daughter 0.008(0.80) – –
Son12 – −0.028**(−1.98) −0.025*(−1.77)
Son13_24/21 – 0.021*(1.89) 0.023*(1.89)
Son25/22 – 0.036***(2.84) 0.037***(3.14)
Daughter12 – 0.025*(1.70) 0.028*(1.91)
Daughter13_24/19 – 0.010(0.88) 0.009(0.69)
Daughter25/20 – 0.012(0.79) 0.017(1.55)
Age −0.000(−0.91) −0.001*(−1.89) −0.001*(−1.80)
College −0.019(−1.18) −0.017(−1.02) −0.016(−0.96)
Household size 0.013***(4.50) 0.009***(2.91) 0.009***(2.90)
Migrant −0.002(−0.10) 0.003(0.16) 0.003(0.15)
Party membership 0.021**(2.05) 0.022**(2.12) 0.022**(2.12)
Household income 0.041***(5.85) 0.039***(5.56) 0.039***(5.55)
Household wealth 0.005***(3.35) 0.005***(3.40) 0.005***(3.40)
Employee 0.024(1.64) 0.023(1.58) 0.022(1.54)
Selfemployed 0.040**(2.31) 0.041**(2.35) 0.040**(2.30)
Agriculture 0.011(0.71) 0.009(0.58) 0.009(0.57)
Other job types −0.007(−0.28) −0.008(−0.33) −0.009(−0.37)
Retired 0.018(1.07) 0.022(1.30) 0.023(1.34)
Riskaversion −0.014(−1.57) −0.015*(−1.74) −0.015*(−1.73)
Policyareas −0.026(−0.82) −0.029(−0.92) −0.030(−0.95)
Urban −0.006(−0.53) −0.007(−0.63) −0.007(−0.61)
Observations 5815 5815 5815
9 It is also noteworthy that when differentiating provinces with high sex ratios from provinces with low sex 
ratios, the marginal effect associated with the presence of young daughters is no longer significant in either 
type of province. In addition, that same marginal effect is insignificant both in rural and urban areas (see 
Tables 4 and 5).
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houses, whilst a larger household size is also linked with a higher chance of acquiring an 
additional dwelling.
Colum 3 of Table 3 reports results where the legal marriage ages for males (22) and 
females (20) are considered instead of the threshold of 25. Specifically, the age categories 
for males (females) are less than 13, 13 to 21 (13 to 20), and 22 (20) and above.10 The 
results are very similar to those reported in column 2.11
6.2  Does living in a high sex‑ratio province make a difference?
Table 4 presents Probit estimates of Eqs. (3) and (4).12 High-sex ratio provinces are defined 
as those provinces with sex ratios falling in the top half of the distribution.13 Sex ratios are 
calculated at birth and are taken from the 2010 Population Census (National Bureau of Sta-
tistics, 2010). Focusing on column 1, we observe that the son and daughter dummy vari-
ables never show statistically significant marginal effects in both high-sex ratio provinces 
and other provinces.
Column 2 differentiates children by age using 25 as the marriage age and column 3 uses 
instead the legal marriage age for males and females. Focusing on column 2 (3), we can 
see that having a son aged 25 (22) or above is associated with a 5.0 (4.8) percentage point 
higher chance of acquiring an additional dwelling in the regions with the highest sex ratios. 
Theses findings, which are consistent with Hypothesis 3, suggest that, especially in regions 
characterised by high sex ratios, households with a son close to marriage age are more 
likely to acquire additional houses, to enhance their son’s chance in the marriage market.
In regions characterised by relatively low sex ratios, having a son aged between 13 and 
24, or 25 and above does not affect the chance of acquiring an additional dwelling. Yet, in 
these regions, having a son younger than 13 is associated with a 3.6 percentage point (col-
umn 2) or 3.3 percentage point (column 3) lower chance of acquiring an additional house. 
This could be explained bearing in mind that in regions with low sex ratios, where the 
competition for marriage is less fierce, parents may prefer to use their savings to provide 
a better education to their young son. As a result, they are less likely to acquire additional 
houses. To justify this claim, we observe that in regions with low sex ratios, education 
expenditure is 432.217 RMB higher than in provinces characterized by high sex ratios.14 
This difference corresponds to about 5.3% of the average education expenditure (8146.249 
RMB) in China.
10 In our preferred specifications, we chose 25 as the age of marriage, as the majority of Chinese people 
tend to get married later than the legal age. For instance, based on the 2013 wave of the China Household 
Finance Survey, only 14.57% (13.37%) of females (males) aged 20 (22) were married.
11 For robustness, we have verified whether the presence of sons in general and of sons in particular age 
groups affect the probability of owning (rather than acquiring) more than one house. The results, which are 
not reported for brevity, but available upon request, were very similar to those in Table 3. It would also have 
been interesting to investigate the extent to which the birth of a son or the transiting of a son into marriage 
age relates to the probability of acquiring additional houses. Yet, due to insufficient observations in our 
sample, we were unable to carry out this test.
12 It should be noted that because these models include a dummy equal to 1 in high-sex ratio provinces, and 
0 otherwise, individual provincial dummies were not included.
13 These provinces, with the corresponding sex ratios in parentheses, are: Gansu (117.37); Fujian (125.59); 
Hunan (123.23); Anhui (128.64); Hebei (114.88); Jiangsu (116.24); Guangdong (120.34); Shaanxi 
(115.33); Henan (117.77); Sichuan (111.64); Hubei (124.09); Guangxi (122.68); Jiangxi (122.84); and 
Chongqing (112.51). Inner Mongolia, Yunan, and Xinjiang are not available in our dataset.
14 We measure education expenditure making use of the following question in the CHFS questionnaire 
(G1016b): “What was the amount spent on the child’s education? (unit: RMB)”.
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Table 5  Determinants of the probability of acquiring multiple homes differentiating households on the 
basis of the child’s gender and age, as well as on whether the household lives in a province characterized by 
a high sex ratio (marginal effects)—Urban/Rural households
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level; ** denotes statistical significance at 5% level;* 
denotes statistical significance at 10% level. Definitions of all variables can be found in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. All models were estimated using a Probit estimator
Urban households Rural households
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Kids; dy/dx (z-value) Age; dy/dx (z-value) Kids; dy/dx (z-value) Age; dy/dx (z-value)
Son
 High*son −0.005(−0.30) – 0.036**(2.00) –
 (1-High)*son −0.010(−0.64) – −0.016(−0.53) –
Daughter
 High*daughter 0.004(0.25) – −0.002(−0.14) –
 (1-High)*daughter −0.007(−0.40) – 0.016(0.50) –
Age of Children
 Son12
  High*son12 – −0.035*(−1.93) – 0.003(0.09)
  (1-High)*son12 – −0.041**(−2.16) – −0.026(−0.65)
 Son13_24
  High*son13_24 – 0.002(0.09) – 0.040*(1.81)
  (1-High)*son13_24 – 0.012(0.58) – 0.032(0.88)
 Son25
  High*son25 – 0.042*(1.74) – 0.060**(2.39)
  (1-High)*son25 – 0.015(0.70) – −0.017(−0.50)
 Daughter12
  High*daughter12 – 0.022(0.86) – 0.027(0.78)
  (1-High)*daughter12 – 0.016(0.61) – 0.040(0.71)
 Daughter13_24
  High*daughter13_24 – 0.010(0.51) – 0.003(0.13)
  (1-High)*daughter13_24 – −0.003(−0.16) – −0.030(−0.87)
 Daughter25
  High*daughter25 – −0.003(−0.13) – 0.006(0.22)
  (1-High)*daughter25 – −0.009 (−0.35) – 0.093(1.46)
 Controls
  Age −0.000(−0.65) −0.001(−1.45) −0.001(−0.74) −0.001(−1.04)
  College −0.032*(−1.86) −0.029*(−1.73) – –
  Household size 0.015***(3.62) 0.011**(2.42) 0.011***(2.69) 0.008*(1.71)
  Migrant −0.003(−0.15) 0.002(0.08) −0.006(−0.07) −0.001(−0.01)
  Party membership 0.019(1.61) 0.020*(1.65) 0.025(1.24) 0.026(1.27)
  Household income 0.031***(3.95) 0.031***(3.82) 0.054***(3.63) 0.050***(3.33)
  Household wealth 0.008***(4.50) 0.008***(4.52) −0.003(−0.95) −0.002(−0.72)
  Employee 0.025(1.45) 0.025(1.47) 0.026(0.90) 0.024(0.82)
  Selfemployed 0.026(1.28) 0.029(1.44) 0.089**(2.57) 0.090***(2.60)
  Agriculture 0.004(0.18) 0.004(0.17) 0.027(1.11) 0.025(1.03)
  Other job types −0.018(−0.60) −0.017(−0.60) 0.005(0.11) 0.004(0.08)
  Retired 0.005(0.27) 0.010(0.54) 0.077(1.55) 0.077(1.55)
  Riskaversion −0.012(−1.12) −0.014(−1.29) −0.013(−0.84) −0.013(−1.85)
  Policyareas −0.004(−0.18) 0.004(−0.20) 0.032*(1.66) 0.034*(1.76)
  High 0.020*(1.94) 0.021**(2.05) −0.017(−1.03) −0016(−0.97)
Observations 3861 3861 1947 1947
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Finally, the marginal effects reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 show that having 
a daughter, regardless of her age, and regardless of the type of region the family lives in, 
does not affect the likelihood of acquiring an additional dwelling. It is also interesting to 
note that the marginal effects associated with the high-sex ratio dummies are never statisti-
cally significant. The marginal effects associated with the other control variables are simi-
lar to those observed in Table 3.
It could be that what determines multiple dwelling acquisition is the number of children/
sons in the family and the number of children/sons at the marriage age rather than the pres-
ence of children in relevant groups. To test whether this is the case, in columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 4, we have replaced the children dummies in our models with numerical variables 
denoting the number of children in relevant groups. The results suggest that none of the var-
iables denoting number of sons/daughters in general and in each age category attract statisti-
cally significant marginal effects. Hence, we conclude that what matters is not the number of 
children in given categories, but simply the presence of at least one child in a given group.
6.3  Are rural areas different from urban areas?
Lei and Pals (2011) show that son preferences are weaker in cities, which could lead to a 
weaker association between the presence of sons and the likelihood to purchase additional 
houses. To see whether this is the case, we next test whether there are any differences in 
our results across urban and rural areas.
Table 5 reports estimates of our main specifications separately for rural and urban sam-
ples. The estimates of Eq. (3) are presented in column 1 for urban households and column 
3 for rural households, whilst the estimates of Eq. (4) appear in columns 2 and 4, for urban 
and rural households respectively. Focusing on columns 1 and 3, we observe that only 
in rural areas, having a son is associated with a higher chance of acquiring an additional 
house in provinces with high sex ratio (column 3). Specifically, having a son is associated 
with a 3.6 percentage point higher chance of acquiring an additional dwelling.
Next, differentiating the children by age, we observe that in rural areas characterised by 
a high sex ratio, having a son aged 25 or above is associated with a 6.0 percentage point 
higher chance of acquiring an additional house (column 4). The corresponding percentage 
in urban areas is much smaller (4.2 percentage points, column 2). It is also noteworthy that, 
in rural areas with high sex ratios, the presence of a son aged 13 to 24 is also associated 
with a 4.0 percentage point higher chance of acquiring an additional house.
Furthermore, in urban areas having a son aged 12 or younger is associated with a lower 
chance of acquiring an additional house (column 2). This effect is apparent in all types of 
provinces, but is only marginally significant and relatively small in high-sex ratio prov-
inces. As discussed in Sect. 6.2, this pattern can be explained bearing in mind that parents 
with young sons may prefer to spend their money on the education of their sons, especially 
in provinces with relatively low sex ratio, where the competition for marriage is less fierce, 
and in urban areas where the son preference is weaker. Finally, the marginal effects associ-
ated with the presence of female children in the family are never statistically significant 
regardless of the age of the child and location.
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7  Conclusions
We have used the 2011 and 2013 waves of the China Household Finance Survey to test, for 
the first time, the extent to which the acquisition of multiple houses is determined by the 
presence of male children in the family. We have differentiated children according to age 
and have assessed the extent to which living in a high-sex ratio region makes a difference. 
We have found that families with sons aged 25 or older are most likely to acquire additional 
houses. This effect is highest in regions characterised by higher sex ratios, especially in 
rural areas. Our findings complement those in Li and Wu (2017) who find that households 
with a son have a higher probability of owning a house, own more and larger houses, and 
acquire their houses earlier. They also complement Wei et  al. (2017) who show that in 
regions characterised by higher sex ratios, households, and especially those with unmarried 
sons at home, tend to buy larger houses and to pay a higher price per square meter.
Our results suggest that Chinese families’ son-preference culture may be an explanation 
for the housing boom in China, a country characterised by unbalanced sex ratios. The ter-
mination of the one child policy in 2016 is likely to slowly restore the sex ratio to normal 
levels. When this happens, households may have a lower incentive to acquire additional 
dwellings to enhance their sons’ marriage prospects. That may contribute to a slowing 
down of the housing boom.
Yet, the improvement of sons’ marriage prospects is not the only reason why Chinese 
people acquire multiple homes. The investment motive for acquiring houses plays in fact 
an important role too. Bearing in mind the very high saving rate characterising Chinese 
households (Choi et  al., 2017) and the substantial increase in house prices observed in 
recent years, which allows home owners to benefit from substantial capital gains (Li and 
Wu, 2014; Cao et al., 2018), housing represents a lucrative and popular type of investment 
in China. The investment motive for acquiring additional houses in China is strong also 
because the relatively poorly developed financial sector offers few alternative investment 
channels. Moreover, Chinese households find it difficult to invest overseas due to the strin-
gent capital controls imposed by the government (Liu and Xiong, 2018). A thorough study 
of other explanations for why Chinese households tend to acquire multiple homes is on the 
agenda for future research.
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Appendix
Table A1 contains precise definitions of the main variables used in the paper.
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Table A1  Definition of the main variables used
Note * A household is assumed to have acquired an additional property between the 2011 and 2013 waves 
of the survey if it owned at least one house in both years and if the difference between the number of houses 
it owned in the two years is greater than or equal to 1
Variable Name Description
Dependent Variable
Acquiremulti Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has acquired an additional property 
between the 2011 and 2013 waves of the survey, and 0  otherwise*
Independent Variables Related to Children
Son Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one son, and 0 other-
wise
Daughter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one daughter, and 0 
otherwise
Son12 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one son aged under 13, 
and 0 otherwise
Son13_24 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one son aged between 
13 and 24, and 0 otherwise
Son25 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one son aged 25 or 
above, and 0 otherwise
Daughter12 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one daughter aged 
under 13, and 0 otherwise
Daughter13_24 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one daughter aged 
between 13 and 24, and 0 otherwise
Daughter25 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has at least one daughter aged 25 
or above, and 0 otherwise
Other Independent Variables
Age Age of household head
Wealth Household’s net wealth
Income Household’s total income
College Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has a college degree, and 0 other-
wise
Household size Size of the household
Migrant Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a migrant, and 0 otherwise
Party membership Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is a party member, and 0 otherwise
Riskaversion Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head prefers low-risk investments, and 
0 otherwise
Employee Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head works as an employee, and 0 
otherwise
Self-employed Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is self-employed, and 0 otherwise
Agriculture Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head works in agriculture, and 0 other-
wise
Other job types Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head has another type of job, and 0 
otherwise
Retired Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household head is retired, and 0 otherwise
Geographic location
Urban Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is located in an urban area, and 0 
otherwise
Policy area Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is located in the three first-tier cities in 
China (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou), and 0 otherwise
High Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is located in a province with high sex 
ratio (Gansu, Guangdong, Fujian, Hunan, Anhui, Hebei, Jiangsu, Shaanxi, Henan, 
Sichuan, Hubei, Guangxi, Jiangxi, Chongqing), and 0 otherwise
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